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This paper considers an in…nitely repeated Cournot duopoly with Imperfect Mon-
itoring. Each …rm does not observe the production level of the other …rm, but instead
observes only a noisy private signal (the price of the product). We show that if the
support of the signal is not too large, there is an equilibrium in which both …rms pro-
duce the cartel level of output. This equilibrium is a result of a slight modi…cation of
the grim trigger strategy, showing that the concept of a grim trigger strategy works in
a more general context than has previously been envisioned. A Folk Theorem is also
established for our game.
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11 Introduction
Thequestionofhowcooperative motivescanarisein acompetitive industryhas beendebated
for a long time. Starting with Stigler’s work (1964), the dynamic motivation for forming a
cartel has been extensively considered. The idea stems from restricting industry production
to the monopoly level in the long run. This level of production gives an extra pro…t to each
memberofthe cartel comparedtothe short runNashequilibrium- e.g. theCournot outcome.
The monopoly output is supported by the threat that a deviation of any member from the
cooperative cartel output is punished by moving the whole industry to the static Nash
Equilibrium outcome. This threat is sequentially rational, and generates a self-enforcing
cartel in the industry.
The kind of threats that can be credibly made is sensitive to the information structure
available to the …rms. We can identify three cases.
First, the case of Perfect Monitoring is one in which there is perfect observability of every
…rm’s output. For this case, it has been shown that for a su¢ciently high discount rate, the
…rms can cooperate forever (e.g. Friedman (1971) and Abreu (1982)).
Inthe case of Public Monitoring …rms knowonly their ownoutput and a publicly observed
signal related to the joint actions of all …rms - typically, the price of the product in the
market. For this case, the following industry behavior has been shown to sustain the cartel
output: …rms cooperate as long as the price is higher than some threshold price level, and
the industry falls to the non-cooperative phase for several periods in response to a low price
realization. After a low-price phase, …rms curtail production and the industry returns to one
characterized by cooperation. Hence in equilibrium, production ‡uctuates according to the
dynamics of the signal. More details can be found in Green and Porter (1984) and Abreu,
Pearce and Stacchetti (1986).1
This paper examines a model with the third type of information structure, Private Mon-
itoring. Private monitoring occurs when each …rm observes its own private signal of the
actions of the other …rms. In the industry modeled, there are two …rms interacting for
in…nitely many periods. The product is homogeneous, and each …rm observes its own pro-
1Empirical support for this type of price behavior can be found in Brander and Zhang (1993), Ellison
(1994) and Levenstein (1997).
2duction and a realized price, the latter of which is imperfectly related to the actions of the
other …rm. This price is, in fact, a signal imperfectly related to the actions of the other …rm.
We assume that the realization prices may di¤er between the …rms although the product
is homogenous. Speci…cally, each …rm observes a separate realized price that is a function
of the aggregate output and a …rm speci…c random shock. The shocks are assumed to be
independent and thus a …rm’s realized price is private information. This is a novel assump-
tion in the oligopoly literature and not only captures the empirical evidence that prices do
di¤er for the same good and but is also closely related to the speci…cation used in models
of di¤erentiated products.2 In the model, a …rm uses its realized price and its knowledge of
the structure of the demand curve to obtain an estimate of the other …rm’s production level.
We refer to this estimate, which is used heavily in the paper, as a …rm’s signal.
Because of their more realistic nature, private monitoring games have recently become
quite popular, with Prisoner’s Dilemmas being the most commonly studied stage game.3
In private monitoring games there is asymmetric information, as each player observes her
opponents’ actions imperfectly. So far it has been shown that for in…nitely repeated games,
similar to the game considered in the present paper, the Folk Theorem generally fails.4 This
happens because unlike in a public or perfect monitoring environment, …rms do not have any
joint knowledge of the behavior of each other; therefore, they cannot coordinate a switch to
a punishment phase.5 The complications stemming from the private monitoring information
structure have made it hard to examine under what conditions, if any, …rms would be able
to coordinate their actions. The central goal of this paper is to address this question.
The game theory literatureo¤ers some insight intothis problem. Matshushima(1991)and
Compte (2002) examine a general class of games with a simple structure (a …nite number of
possibleactions andsignal realizations). They showthat, in general, no degree of cooperation
canbemaintained. Malaith and Morris (2002) consider games of “almost public monitoring”
2Tedeschi (1994) uses similar approach in the public monitoring contest.
3See, for example, Bhaskar (1999), Ely and Valimaki (2002), Mailath and Morris (2002), Piccione (2002)
and Sekiguchi (1998).
4Another name for this phenomenon is the “anti-folk theorem” result. See Compte (2002) and Matsushima
(1991).
5Although, if communication is allowed, which is excluded in our model, then is possible to have positive
result. See Aoyagi (1997), Compte (1998) and Kandori and Matsushima (1998).
3in which each player observes the same signal with probability close to one. They …nd an
almost e¢cient outcome in those games. An approach similar to theirs applied to oligopoly
games might yield an outcome close to full cooperation. Therefore, the literature suggests
that in oligopoly models, there might be at most partial cooperation when the Private
Information structure is close to the Public one.
The information structure is a key factor preventing the lack of perfect cooperation under
private monitoring. However, it is not the only obstacle, as evidenced by the fact that perfect
cooperation is not attainable under public monitoring. Another factor that prevents full
cooperation is the range of signal realizations. In fact, previous research has only considered
a constant range for signal realizations - namely, the support of the signal realizations does
not depend on …rms’ actions.
Consider an equilibrium strategy that forces all players to play the mono-poly outcome
always. This means thateach…rm should produce the cooperative outcome forevery possible
realization of its signal. When a particular …rm takes an action, each of its competitors
observes a noisy signal of that …rm’s action. By assumption, the supports of those signals
are independent of the …rm’s action. Since in the proposed equilibrium the opponents always
produce at the collusive level, the best response for the …rm is to produce an amount higher
than the collusive level. In other words, it is not rational for the …rm to sustain cooperation
all the time, which means that there is no full cooperation in these games. Instead, these
games display almost full cooperation. To attain it, the support of the signal received by
a …rm is usually divided into two regions: one where the …rm sustains cooperation, and
another where the …rm starts punishment. When the …rms cooperate, a …rm is more likely
than not to receive signals that induce it to sustain cooperation, but occasionally it gets
signals that prompt it to punish, despite the fact that no cheating has occurred.
In the contrast to previous work the key property of the model considered in this paper
is that the support of the signal, which is assumed to be bounded, changes with the actions
of the …rms. In this case, if a …rm observes a signal outside the range that corresponds
to cooperation, it is certain that a deviation has occurred, but this fact is not common
knowledge. Since this information is the private knowledge of the detecting …rm, a strategy
that calls for an immediate coordinated punishment cannot be implemented. Although a
4shifting support for the signal does not remove the informational asymmetry, it creates
conditions which allow full cooperation and for the Folk Theorem to hold.
Under a shifting support for the signal we show that for signals without too much noise -
signals with su¢ciently narrow support - all …rms produce the monopoly output level all the
time in equilibrium. The equilibrium shown is the result of …rms following a modi…ed “grim
trigger” strategy, which among other things speci…es that a …rm detecting a deviation in the
current period produces a high output level in the next period. This action transmits to the
industry the information that a deviation has been detected, thereby triggering all industry
to punish the deviator in all future periods. Other components of the strategy make this
initiation of punishment optimal.
It will be shown that this strategy allows the …rms to realize the full monopoly pro…t
for the same range of discount factors as in the full information case, as long as the range
of varying of realized prices is not too wide. This …nding thus demonstrates that a key
result from an environment with perfect monitoring will hold in an environment with private
monitoring, and that simple variants of the Grim Trigger Strategy are applicable in more
general contexts. Additionally, weobtainthefollowingFolk Theoremresult formymodel: for
any individually rational feasible outcome there exists an equilibrium strategy that supports
this outcome, as long as the discount factor is su¢ciently high and the range of prices is
su¢ciently concentrated.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give a formal description of the
model. Sections 3, 4 and 5 provide results for the perfect, public and private monitoring
cases, respectively. Section 6 considers the sensitivity of our results with respect to the shape
of the signal’s density, and Section 7 explores the Folk Theorem for our game. Section 8
presents some concluding observations.
2 The Model
Consider the following Cournot duopoly model with in…nitely many periods. There are
two identical …rms that produce the same product. In each time period t, …rm 1 produces
quantity q1
t and …rm 2 quantity q2
t. Since the …rms are identical, the superscript i is used
5for the …rm of interest and j for her opponent. In every period each …rm has zero cost of
production. In period t, …rm i’s realized price, pi
t, is imperfectly related to the current total
production of two …rms: qi
t+q
j
t. In the model, we assume the conventional linear dependence
between price and total quantity, but unlike most previous models price is assumed as
random. Namely, the price is a¤ected by a shock which is additive and not related to the
total quantity produced. The mathematical form of this relation is6
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t is the price shock. The reason for this notation will be clear shortly.
As mentioned before, the scope of the paper is to consider the two situations of imperfect
monitoring: public and private. In both cases the player does not observe the rival’s action,
q
j
t, but rather observes her own realization price, pi
t, a price which may di¤er from that
of the other …rm. When the realized prices do not di¤er, the public monitoring situation
takes place. On the other hand, the realized prices might be di¤erent. Such the situation
will arise, for example, if …rms sell di¤erentiated products where each …rm faces the same
price disturbed by an idiosyncratic “brand shock”. This moves us to the private monitoring
environment which is the primary interest of this paper.
Let us describe the information available to a …rm. At the beginning of the period t …rm
i decides the amount to produce, qi
t. The realized price of the product pi
t becomes known
at the end of period t after the quantities qi
t and q
j
t are chosen. Firm i never observes the
quantity q
j
t produced by the other …rm. Instead, because the …rm knows the market demand




t¡1 can be generated
at theend of periodt. We refer to the signal as either pi
t or ~ q
j
t, where the latter entity receives
such a denotation since it can be derived directly from the price realization, pi
t. The next








From all of the above it follows that at the end of period t …rm i gets actual pro…t pi
tqi
t.
By formulae (1) and (2) the same pro…t expressed in terms of quantity produced and the
6This function without loss of generality presents any linear demand after proper rescaling.
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Next, it is assumed that each …rm has the intertemporal discount factor ±; so …rm i’s
utility, ui, will be the discounted sum of its pro…ts:







In the paper we assume that the shocks ("1
t;"2
t) are independent and identically distrib-
uted (i.i.d.) over time with zero expected value.7 Furthermore, each shock "
j
t has a limited
support. Notice that the support of player i’s estimate ~ q
j
t of player j’s action is always
centered around q
j
t due to formula (2), so that this support moves together with q
j
t. This
speci…cation contrasts with the one usually made in most of the imperfect monitoring lit-
erature, where each player’s action has no e¤ect on the support of the signal observed by
her opponent. For demonstration of the main results of the paper, we assume that "
j
t is
uniformly distributed on [¡r;r], an assumption which makes our problem more tractable
mathematically. A more general form for the support of the noise is considered in Section 6.
As we mentioned above, each …rm makes its decision before its pro…t is realized. The
decision is based upon beliefs about the action of the other player. Hence for the further
analysis it is necessary to introduce the notion of a …rm’s expected pro…t - the pro…t which












where Ef:j:g stands for conditional expectation.
Note the following two facts:
- The expected pro…t has the same form as in the perfect monitoring case (there is no
shock)8;
- Our model incorporates the Perfect Information situation as a special case when r = 0.
Regarding the joint distribution of "1
t and "2
t, we consider three cases. The …rst one is the
case of perfect monitoring. The second is the case of public monitoring, in which shocks are
7The zero mean makes ~ q
j
t an unbiased estimator of q
j
t
8This is due to the linear dependence between player i’s pro…t and the signal.
7the same "1
t = "2
t, i.e. the two …rms face the same price, but this price is still random and
does not give exact information about the quantity produced by the other …rm. The third
case is the private monitoring case, which arises when "1
t and "2
t are independent.9
3 Perfect monitoring and the “grim trigger” strategy
The model becomes a perfect monitoring model when r = 0. In this situation the so called
“grim trigger” strategy pro…le helps to support the cooperative outcome.
Brie‡y recall the concept of this kind of strategy. First of all, the e¢cient symmetric
outcome for this gametakes place wheneach player chooses toproduceQP = 1=4, the Pareto
e¢cient quantity for both players. This gives each player the maximum possible symmetric
pro…t ¼P = 1=8. We refer to this strategy as the restricted, optimal, cooperative or cartel
output. In a one period setting, this game has a unique Nash equilibrium, where each player
plays the Cournot outcome quantity QC = 1=3, and obtains a pro…t of ¼C = 1=9. We refer
to this strategy as noncooperative or Cournot output. The well known grim strategy, which
allows for certain values of ± the e¢cient outcome in an in…nitely repeatedgame with perfect
monitoring, is stated below.
The grim trigger strategy:
Produce the e¢cient quantity QP initially and as long as every player produced QP in
the last period; otherwise produce the disagreement quantity QC.
The above strategy is sequentially optimal only for certain values of ±. The next well
known result is quite simple and speci…es this range. We provide it here with the proof
because the range of ± turns out to be universal for all results of the paper.
Result 1: The grim trigger strategy is a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy for any
± 2 [±;1), where ± = 9=17.
PROOF: To …nd the condition on the values of ± required to support equilibrium we need
to check that any one-period deviation from cooperation does not o¤set the long run losses.
9Of course, there is an intermediate case of partial correlation between the "’s, but the analysis of such
a case is beyond the scope of this paper.
8The highest possible short run gain comes from playing 3=8, which is the static game best
response to the opponent’s play of QP = 1=4. This deviation yields a pro…t of 9=64, which is
higher than the one period equilibrium payo¤ 1=8. In every subsequent period the deviator
is punished and gets the Cournot payo¤ 1=9. Hence, the sequential optimality of the grim














Note that ± will remain the lower bound for ± in the imperfect monitoring case, because
the deviation described in the proof of Result 1 is also possible in any other case with
expected short run payo¤s of the same form as in the perfect monitoring case.
4 Public monitoring and public grim trigger strategy
Under public monitoring both …rms sell their products for the same random price. In any
time period t, the …rm knows its own production levels in all previous periods and all past
price realizations. A …rm does not know the production of its opponent, but does know
that its opponent’s realization price is the same. For this reason, the price allows the …rms
to synchronize their actions. In other words, if the strategy of a …rm only depends on
only the price realization, …rms can cooperate while observing “good” prices and initiate an
immediate punishment after any “bad” price.
Now suppose that both …rms produce the cooperative outcome (QP;QP) = (1=4;1=4)
at some period t ¡ 1. According to formula (1), the realization of the price will be in
[1 ¡2QP ¡ r;1¡ 2QP +r] = [1=2¡ r;1=2+ r]. Any realization of price below the threshold
level 1 ¡ 2QP ¡ r means that the rival has produced more than QP and as a result she
can be punished by moving to the Cournot outcome (QC;QC) = (1=3;1=3) forever.10 By
formula (1), the price is below 1¡ 2QP ¡ r if and only if the production qi
t¡1 of …rm i plus
10The …rm may also punish for too high price realizations, ones which are higher than 1 ¡ 2QP + r.
However, such action is not optimal since these signals are generated by low production, which decreases the
opponent’s pro…t.
9Figure 1: Signal realizations with non overlapping supports. We have drawn the possible
signal realizations when a player’s opponent plays either QP or QC. The corresponding supports
are separated. Hence if the player knows for sure that one of QP and QC has been played she can
correctly guess the right one.
the “estimate” of its rival’s production, ~ q
j
t¡1, is less than 2QP + r. We use this observation
to construct the public grim trigger strategy as a minor adaptation of the Green and Porter
(1984) strategy.














t¡1 · 2QP +r
QC otherwise
(5)
The above strategy helps to support the cartel outcome for the whole duration of the
game. Now the only question that remains is, for which values of ± and r does the above
strategy constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Pure Strategies?
From now on we will impose a restriction on highest possible level of r. This restriction
dramatically simpli…es the equilibrium analysis and as it is shown below is not an “active”
restriction for the main result of the paper. The model requires that the support of the
signal under the opponent’s play QP does not overlap with the support under QC. So for








Figure 1 provides a graphical presentation at this assumption.
The result below describes the set of values for ± and r for which the strategy under
interest supports an equilibrium.
10Result 2: Given restriction (6), the Public Grim Trigger Strategy is a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium in Pure Strategies strategy for any







The borderline for r is an increasing function of ±. The intuition is the following. Suppose
we increase the noisiness of the signal to r0 > r. This lowers the probability of punishment
for the same level of deviation because the density of the noise becomes smaller. So to make
r0 a border point we need to increase the discount factor ± to some ±
0 > ±. In this case
the level of long run punishment becomes higher and the short run bene…ts get smaller to
compensate having a lower probability of punishment.
PROOF: Any output level produced as a deviation is denoted by q. There are two types
of deviations. The …rst type is a “large” deviation, with q ¸ QP + 2r. This deviation is
detectedby the opponent for sure, so the rest of the game continues with the certainoutcome
(QC;QC). Since the one period best response to QP = 1=4 , which is 3=8; is itself a large
deviation, the analysis is equivalent to that of the perfect monitoring case, which yields the
restriction on ± given by condition (4).







. In this situation, with probability
q¡QP
2r the price for the current period
will be lower than the threshold level, and the game will end up in the noncooperative
outcome (QC;QC) which gives the one period payo¤ 1=9. Otherwise, the game will continue
in the cooperative phase with payo¤ 1=8 as prescribed by the equilibrium strategy. For our
strategy to be optimal the set of following inequalities must hold for all such q’s.
1
8















The left side of inequality represents the equilibrium payo¤. On the right side, which is
payo¤ from deviation, the …rst summand stands for the payo¤ during the deviation period
and the second summand corresponds to the expected continuation payo¤ after deviation.
Now notice that the deviation payo¤s are concave in q and equal to 1=8 when q = 1=4.
11Figure 2: Deviation payo¤s for public monitoring. We have drawn the deviation payo¤ for
three di¤erent values of r (r1 < r2 < r3) under …xed ±. The higher r the larger the payo¤ from
playingq. The line with zero derivative w.r.t. q at q = 1=4 corresponds to r = r2. For any r > r2
the payo¤ is higher than 1=8 for some q > 1=4 and for r · r2 the payo¤ from deviation is always
less than 1=8.











The speci…c form of the relationship between r and ± arises because given q the deviation
payo¤ is an increasing function of r. This happens because the probability of punishment
(q ¡ 1=4)=(2r) (see Figure 3) becomes smaller the larger is r. We draw the borderline for r
in Figure 8 (r2 on Figure 2 is a point of the borderline).
The only thing left to specify is the players’ beliefs. Clearly, the trivial belief that the
opponent will play QP given the game has been in cooperation (qi
t¡1 + ~ q
j
t¡1 · 2QP + r) and
QC otherwise, makes our strategy optimal. This belief is consistent with Bayes’ rule on the
equilibrium path of game. On this path every player always plays QP and observes that
~ q
j
t¡1 · QP + r. The proof is complete by specifying that o¤ the equilibrium path a …rm
believes that its opponent will play QC.11 Q.E.D.
Notice that the lowest level of the signal’s noisiness (level of r) for which the cooperation
outcome cannot be sustained takes place for the lowest level of the discount factor, and is
11We are free to choose any beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path.
12equal to 1=36. This means that if r is no more then one third of the distance between the
cooperative and noncooperative production level then collusion is sustainable for the same
range of the discount factor as in the perfect monitoring environment.
5 Private monitoring and private grim trigger strategy
Nowconsider theprivate monitoringcase, in whichthe signalsare independent across players.
Recall that shocks that satisfy restriction (6) are only considered. These values of r are such
that any estimate of the opponent’s play when she actually plays QP = 1=4 di¤ers from any
estimate when her opponent actually plays QC = 1=3.
For this informational situation it is possible to construct an analog of the grim trigger
strategy. Suppose that both…rms agree tosupport the Pareto e¢cient outcome by producing
the same output QP, which gives the one-period expected pro…t ¼P = 1=8 to each …rm. As
with perfect monitoring, each …rm has the temptation to increase production in order to
increase its current pro…t. As in the public monitoring case, two types of deviation are
identi…ed.
The …rst type of deviation is the “large” one. This happens when the player produces
an output q higher than QP + 2r. In this case the opponent’s estimate of the player’s
action will lie between q ¡ r and q + r, while under cooperative play QP the signal would
be in the range [QP ¡ r;QP + r]. Hence the opponent for sure will detect the deviation
and be able to punish the rival by producing the noncooperative outcome QC. Because the
level of the noise r is restricted (restriction (6)) to make the Cournot outcome be a “large”
deviation, the punishment will de…nitely be recognized by the deviator. The rest of the game
will continue in the noncooperative state (QC;QC), which will give the one-period expected
pro…t ¼C = 1=9 to each …rm. In short the large deviations can be punished exactly in the
same way as in the perfect monitoring case, so we can apply the analysis that already exists
in the literature.
The situation is di¤erent when the player tries to make a “small” (QP · q · QP + 2r)
deviation. Suppose a player (deviator) decided to produce more than QP, say, q. This
action induces a signal ~ q not known by the player but received by the opponent which might
13be lower or larger than QP + r. If the signal’s realization is less than this value then the
opponent will not detect the deviation and no punishment will take place. When the signal
~ q is higher than QP + r; the opponent will know for sure that a deviation occurred, and
she can implement the long run punishment by producing QC forever. The period after the
deviation, the deviator will …nd out for sure that the deviation has been detected. Therefore,
she will have to play QC from then on.
The above analysis implies that it might be possible to look for a strategy where any
detected deviation (~ q > QP + r) is immediately punished by the opponent by playing QC
for the rest of the game. Let us now …nd out what is rational for the deviator to play in the
next period after deviation under these circumstances.
To simplify the exposition for the remainder of the section we refer to the subsequent
period after the deviation as the current period t.
While previously playing q > QP the deviator (player i) “alarmed” the opponent with
probability
®(q) = Probf~ qi > QP +rjqi = qg;





Figure 3 provides a description of ®(q).
From now on we will refer to ® simply as “the detection probability”. Notice that ®
uniquely speci…es the last period deviation q by equation (8), so we can safely deal with the
probability instead of the action and use q for the current period action. Now let us analyze
what the player might do after producing the high output level that induced detection
probability ®. Before doing so, let us introduce notation for the expected one period payo¤
during the period after the deviation. The function ¼(q;®) is the short notation for the
expected payo¤ from playing q in the current period when the opponent mixes between QP
and QC with probabilities (1 ¡ ®) and ® respectively. This function has the following form
¼(q;®) = (1¡ ®)(1¡ QP ¡ q)q +®(1 ¡ QC ¡ q)q: (9)
Figure 4 shows the shape of function ¼(q;®).
14Figure 3: The probability of detection. The shaded area denotes the probability of being
detected after a deviation to q. This probability equals probability of getting a signal in the range
[QP +r;q + r], which is ®(q) = (q ¡ QP)=(2r).
One possibility is to play QP, the “penitent” action. Then in the next period the deviator
…nds out with probability ® that she is punished, and both players will play the Cournot
outcome (QC;QC) for the rest of the game. With probability (1¡ ®) the game continues in
the cooperative phase (QP;QP). The decision to play QP gives the expected payo¤
¦P(®;±) = (1¡ ±)¼(QP;®) +±[(1¡ ®)¼P +®¼C]; (10)
where the subscript P denotes the penitent action payo¤.
Another possibility is to produce outcome ^ Q(®) which maximizes her expected current
period pro…t given by formula (9). By taking the derivative of ¼(q;®) with respect to q, and
setting this derivative equal to zero, we get the expression for ^ Q(®):







The level of production ^ Q(®) is always no less than the Cournot level QC for any value
of the probability ®. So this kind of action is a large deviation, and the game will de…nitely
continue at the Cournot level afterwards. This deviation will be detected for sure, and the
expected continuation payo¤ is
¦F(®;±) = (1 ¡ ±)¼(^ Q(®);®) +±¼C; (12)
where the subscript F refers to “the fatal action” ^ Q(®).
15Figure 4: Expected one period pro…t. The one period expected pro…t, ¼(q;®), is a parabola






If the player is restricted in choosing between the penitent action QP or the fatal action
^ Q(®), she will pick the one which will give her the highest continuation payo¤. Intuitively,
when the detection probability ® is low enough one should expect that the action QP will
give a higher payo¤, while the action ^ Q(®) is preferable for a high level of ®. This means
that there is a critical value of the probability under which the penitent and fatal actions
give the same continuation payo¤. We notate this probability as ®¤(±). It comes as the






2 ¡ ± ¡ 7± +3
1¡ ±
: (13)
The graph of ®¤(±) is shown on Figure 5.
If the deviator plays QP when ® · ®¤(±) and ^ Q(®) otherwise, then her opponent’s next
period reaction QC to the signal observed in the range (QP + r;QP + 3r] can be justi…ed
by the belief that the deviator plays action QP + 2r in the previous period. This action
generates the detection probability ® = 1 and so in the current period the deviator’s best
response is ^ Q(1) = QC. Therefore, in the next period the punisher is consistent by playing
QC while observing the signal in the range (QP + r;QP +3r]: she plays a best response to
her rival’s action QC. This …nishes the construction of the joint behavior of the players with
self-sustained beliefs.
16Figure 5: Probability Cuto¤ Level ®¤(±). The threshold level of the probability ®¤(±) is
monotonically increasing in ±. This happens because the higher the ±; the more signi…cant the
long run punishment compared to the short run bene…ts from deviation. For the same reason
®¤(±) = 0 and lim
±!1
®¤(±) = 1. The shaded area shows the value of ® for which the deviator will
want to produce QP, while for ® above the shaded area the deviator produces ^ Q(®).
Having described the key features of the equilibrium strategy, we can present them for-
mally. The action qi
t of player i at time period t depends only on the information received
at period t¡ 1 (qi
t¡1; ~ q
j
t¡1) and has the following form







> > > <
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QP if ®(qi
t¡1) · ®¤(±) and ~ q
j







t¡1) > ®¤(±) and ~ q
j
t¡1 ¡ QP · r
QC otherwise
(14)
where functions ®(¢), ®¤(¢) and ^ Q(¢) are given by formulae (8), (13) and (11), respectively.
This strategy is presented on Figure 6.




t¡1). The dotted line shows the strategy
played by the player when the signal is “bad”, i.e. if a deviation ofthe opponent has been detected
(~ q
j
t¡1 ¡ QP > r). In this case, the player always plays the Cournot outcome QC. The solid
line shows the strategy under a “good” signal (~ q
j
t¡1 ¡ QP · r). The player follows the collusive
agreement QP when its last period production qi
t¡1 generates a probability of being punished by its
opponent no higher than the threshold level ®¤(±) (left part of the graph). In the case of a certain
detection, the player plays QC (right part of the graph). The middle part is a linear combination
of one period best responses QC and
1¡QP
2 on QC and QP, respectively. The weights are equal to
the probabilities of these actions played by the opponent.
We have already described two possible actions that the deviator may choose after her
own deviation. By previous construction the equilibrium payo¤ function is the maximum of
the penitent action payo¤ function (10) and the fatal action payo¤ function (12)
¦¤(®;±) = maxf¦P(®;±);¦F(®;±)g: (15)
Figure 7 shows the equilibrium payo¤ function.
Another possible action after the deviation is to play some “small” deviation.12 This
action induces a detection probability ¯ which can calculated in exactly the same fashion as
12By the construction ^ Q(®) gives highest continuation payo¤ among all large deviations.
18Figure 7: Equilibrium Payo¤ Function ¦¤(®;±). The solid line marks the equilibrium payo¤
function, ¦¤(®;±), which is the maximum of the penitent action payo¤, ¦P(®;±), and the fatal
action payo¤, ¦F(®;±). ¦¤(®;±) is decreasing function of ®. When ± goes up function ¦P pivots
up around point the (0;¼P) and function ¦F is “pressed” down to the level ¼C.
®. Given that the players will follow the equilibrium strategy (14) afterwards, the calculation
of the expected payo¤ after two small deviations with probabilities ® and ¯ is analogous to
the calculation of the expected payo¤s ¦F(®;±) and ¦P(®;±) and is equal to
¦0(®;¯;±;r) = (1 ¡±)¼(QP + 2¯r;®)+ ±[(1¡ ®)¦¤(¯;±) +®¼C]: (16)
It turns out that the payo¤ functions given by formulae (15) and (16) are enough to
characterize the set of± and r for whichthe above strategy constitutes the Nash Equilibrium.
We would also like to show that this equilibrium is one in which players’ out of equi-
librium beliefs are reasonable. Unfortunately, Kreps and Wilson’s de…nition of Sequential
Equilibrium (1982) only pertains to the …nite games - games with a …nite number of infor-
mation sets and a …nite number of actions available at each information set. Our game is not
…nite in either of these aspects. We therefore introduce a consistency principle in the spirit
of Kreps and Wilson to get a re…nement of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. The following
de…nition uses the same concepts as the de…nition of Sequential Equilibrium applied and it
will be applied to our game.13 We call it:
13Similar concepts were used, for example, in Chatterjee and Samuelson (1990) and Simon and Stinchcombe
19De…nition 1: Nash Equilibrium with Consistent Beliefs in Pure Strategies:
Let H denote the collection of information sets of the game and let s:H ! A(H) specify
the pure strategy behavioral strategies of players. Then these strategies yield an equilibrium
if there exists an assessment (¹;s)14 consisting of beliefs ¹ and behavioral strategies s with
the following two properties:
i) Sequential rationality: for the given beliefs, the behavioral strategies yield the largest
continuation payo¤s at each information set.
ii) Consistency: Let sn be a set of completely mixed behavioral strategies. By the notion
of complete mixing we mean that for any information set h, supp(sn) ´ A(h). For each sn,
Bayes’ ruleuniquely speci…es beliefs ¹n. Consistency means thatthere is a weakly converging
sequenceof completely mixed strategy pro…les sn to s suchthat the induced beliefs ¹n weakly
converge to ¹. In short, (¹;s) = limn!1(¹n;sn).
The application of this concept yields the central result of the paper.15
Result 3: Fix a pair (±;r). The private grim trigger strategy described by (14) gives a
Nash Equilibrium with Consistent Beliefs in Pure Strategies if and only if following set of
inequalities holds
¦¤(®;±) ¸ ¦0(®;¯;±;r) 8®;¯ 2 [0;1]; (17)
where, the payo¤ functions ¦¤ and ¦0 are given by formulae (15) and (16).
The above result demonstrates the interesting features of the constructed strategy. First,
any private history, regardless of its length and the sequence of observations, in‡uences
the player’s actions only through ®, the probability of punishment. Second, to check the
optimality ofthestrategy weneedtocheck only oneperioddeviations which are characterized
by the probability of inducing punishment ¯ from them.
The next result gives a closed form description of the set of parameter pairs (±;r) for
which the private grim trigger strategy is an equilibrium one and shows that this set is
(1995).
14Kreps and Wilson use the symbol ¼ instead of s.
15The proof is quite tedious and it is presented in Appendix (A1).
20nonempty.16
Result 4: Let § be the set of pairs (±;r) such that condition (17) holds. Then:
i) 9 ¹ r(±) 2 C[±;1) such that ¹ r(±) > 1
48 for 8± 2 [±;1) and § = f(±;r) : ± 2 [±;1);0 · r ·
¹ r(±)g.



































iii) ¹ r(±) = 9
272, lim
±!1
¹ r(±) = 1
48.
The intuition behind the functions r1(±) and r2(±) is the following. Increasing the prob-
ability of detection ® decreases the long run equilibrium payo¤ at a constant rate, until
® = ®¤(±): From then on, the rate of decrease in the long run payo¤ drops since the player
switches from the penitent action to the fatal action. We show in Appendix (A2) that the
immediate bene…t from deviating …rst o¤sets the long run costs when ® = ®¤(±). Then, by
imposing the condition that the penitent action (¯ · ®¤(±)) can not be pro…table we get
the r1(±) part of the curve ¹ r(±). The proof in the appendix shows that values of ¯ ' 0 are
critical, because the long run loss is linearly increasing with a increase in ¯, while the short
run pro…ts increase at a decreasing rate. Taking care of the fatal action (¯ > ®¤(±)) gives
the r2(±) part of the curve ¹ r(±). In this case, the critical values of ¯ are di¢cult to determine
explicitly. Graphical analysis shows a negative relationship between ± and the critical value
of ¯.
The function ¹ r(±) is depicted on Figure 8 along with the borderline for the public moni-
toring case.
From the picture we can see that the values of r for which cooperation can be sustained
are comparable to the ones in the public monitoring case. Also for r · 1=48; the cooperative
16The proof of this result is technical and can be found in Appendix (A2).
21Figure 8: The sets for which the Public and Private Strategies are equilibrium ones. The
shaded area marks possible pairs (±;r) for which the private strategy gives an equilibrium. The
line
±
36(1¡±) restricts the area for thepublic monitoring case. Thedotted lines show thecurves r1(±)
and r2(±).
equilibrium is sustainable for the same range of ± as in the perfect monitoring case. Notice
that unlike under public monitoring, the borderline ¹ r(±) is not monotonic in ±. This is a
feature of our particular modi…cation of the grim trigger strategy. However, it might possible
to …nd other modi…cations for this strategy which would make the borderline monotonic.
As mentioned above, restriction (6) on r has no e¤ect on the set § because ¹ r(±) < 1=24
for ± 2 [±;1). Possible realizations of the signal under r · ¹ r(±) when the opponent plays
either QP or QC are shown in Figure 9. We can see clearly that for any ± the supports do
not intersect, so our restriction on possible values of r is not critical.
22Figure 9: Possible signal realizations under private monitoring. Thepossiblesignal realizations
are marked by the shaded area when the player’s opponent plays either QP or QC, for r’s, which
makeourprivate grim trigger strategy an equilibrium one. Note that therealizations are separated
for q = QP and q = QC.
6 Arbitrary distribution of noise
Our analysis so far has relied on the assumption that the signal noises are uniformly distrib-
uted. Surprisingly, the private monitoring results of this paper do not substantially change
if this assumption is relaxed. We demonstrate these results without providing proofs.
Suppose that the noise, "; is distributed on a limited support whose width equals 2r; and
has zero expected value. Let the value of the right end of the support be ER. The noise can
be fully described by the decumulative distribution function measured from the right end of
the support:
F(x) ´ Prob(" > ER ¡ 2rx).
Note that F(0) = 0 and F(1) = 1. Assume, further, that this distribution function has a
continuous density f(x).













> > > <
> > > :
QP if ®(qi
t¡1;F(¢)) · ®¤(±) and ~ q
j







t¡1;F(¢)) > ®¤(±) and ~ q
j
t¡1 ¡ QP · ER
QC otherwise
where the functions ®¤(¢) and ^ Q(¢) are given by formulae (13) and (11).
Result 3 which gives the necessary andsu¢cient conditionfor having an equilibrium stays
the same. In it, the function ¦0(®;¯;±;r) should be understood as
¦
0(®;¯;±;r;F(¢)) = (1 ¡ ±)¼(QP + 2F
¡1(¯)r;®) + ±[(1 ¡®)¦
¤(¯;±)+ ®¼C];
where F¡1(¢) is inverse function of F(¢).
As it will be shown shortly, we have the analog of Result 4 with nonempty set of pairs
(±;r) when we have positive density of the right end of the support (F0(0) > 0). Under this
property of the distribution of the noise we have the borderline ¹ r(±;F(¢)) as the minimum
of two continuous functions, r1(±;F(¢)) and r2(±;F(¢)), which can assume any nonnegative
values. Ingeneral, it is impossible to …nd the shape of thefunctions r1(±;F(¢)) and r2(±;F(¢))
explicitly. Still the curve r1(±;F(¢)) is related to curve r1(±) as follows:
r1(±;F(¢)) · f(0)r1(±):
If the density on the right end of support is equal to zero, then our modi…ed grim trigger
strategy no longer supports cooperation. This is because the short run pro…t gain from an
in…nitesimal increase of production dq is proportional to dq, while the expected long run
costs are proportional to F(dq). Therefore there always exists a small dq such that it will
be optimal for a player to deviate.17
In the case of nonzero density on the right end of support it is possible to show that,
analogous to the uniform case, ¹ r(±;F(¢)) > 0 for any ± 2 [±;1).
17The same problem takes place in the public monitoring situation.
24As a concluding remark to this section, notice that the condition of nonzero density
narrows the applicability of our approach. Still for most economic situations possible values
of price and estimate of production are not continuous. The production and estimate usually
take discrete values of the form fk¢ : ¢ > 0; k = 0;1;2;:::g.18 Given that any noise with
bounded support always has nonzero density on the right end of the support, the direct
translation of our approach for the discrete case yields cooperation with any distribution of
signal with su¢ciently small noisiness.19
7 Nash Reversion Folk Theorem
In this section we show that a private grim trigger strategy may also be used to support any
feasible individually rational outcome with uniform density of noise.20 By an individually
rational outcome for our game we mean a pair of payo¤s (¹ u1; ¹ u2) which gives players no less
than the Cournot outcome ¼P = 1=9 each.
Now it is necessary to choose a pair of actions which yield the pair of payo¤s (¹ u1; ¹ u2).
The candidates ( ¹ Q1; ¹ Q2) are solutions to the following system of equations:
¼( ¹ Q1; ¹ Q2) = ¹ u1
¼( ¹ Q2; ¹ Q1) = ¹ u2
(18)
where function ¼(¢;¢) is given by formula (3). The system (18) might exhibit multiple
solutions, but if at least one solution exists we can always choose the pair where ( ¹ Q1; ¹ Q2) ·
(5=18;5=18) < (QC;QC) = (1=3;1=3).21 In fact, one can establish the following claim, which
we provide without proof:
Claim: For any pair of individually rational feasible payo¤s (¹ u1; ¹ u2) > (¼C;¼C) there
exists a pair of production levels ( ¹ Q1; ¹ Q2) such that ¹ Qi < 5=18 < QC = 1=3 and ( ¹ Q1; ¹ Q2)
18For example, car and airline industries measure production in units.
19The situation with zero density on the right end of the support can also been remedied by allowing grim
trigger strategy to be "-equilibrium. The same type of equilibria are used in Fudenberg and Levine (1991)
and Lehrer (1992).
20The Folk Theorem can naturally be extended for the noise with nonzero density on the right end of the
support. For notational simplicity we demonstrate the result with the uniform noise.









25yield payo¤ (¹ u1; ¹ u2).
The strategy in (14) can be used as a starting point for constructing the strategy which
generates our outcome as an equilibrium. For the chosen pair (¹ Q1; ¹ Q2) the following private









> > > <
> > > :
¹ Qi if ®(qi
t¡1; ¹ Qi) · ®¤(±; ¹ Qi; ¹ Qj) and ~ q
j




t¡1; ¹ Qi); ¹ Qj¢
if ®(qi
t¡1; ¹ Qi) > ®¤(±; ¹ Qi; ¹ Qj) and ~ q
j
t¡1¡ ¹ Qj · r
QC otherwise
(19)
Here, the function ®(q; ¹ Qi) is the probability that player i is detected by the opponent
when playing q instead of ¹ Qi. ^ Q(®;q) is the short run best response while the opponent
mixes q and QC with probabilities (1¡ ®) and ® respectively.
The function ®¤(±; ¹ Qi; ¹ Qj) is the cuto¤ probability level which equalizes the payo¤s from
playing penitent action ¹ Qi and fatal action ^ Q
¡
®; ¹ Qj¢
after a the deviation with a detection
probability ®. We do not present the formula for ®¤(±; ¹ Qi; ¹ Qj) because it is quite bulky and
there is no need for the closed form of this function. The payo¤s from the penitent and the
fatal actions are, respectively
¦P(®;±; ¹ Q
i; ¹ Q











j) = (1¡ ±)¼( ^ Q(®; ¹ Q
j);®; ¹ Q
j)+ ±¼C; (21)
where ¼(q;®; ¹ Qj) is one period expected payo¤ from playing q when the opponent mixes ¹ Qj
and QC with probabilities (1¡ ®) and ® respectively. Again the equilibrium payo¤ function
¦¤(¯;±; ¹ Qi; ¹ Qj) is maximum of ¦P(®;±; ¹ Qi; ¹ Qj) and ¦F(®;±; ¹ Qi; ¹ Qj).
AsinSection5we needtocareaboutpayo¤s which arise from initiating “small” deviations
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We can now describe our Folk Theorem.
26Result 5 (Nash Reversion Folk Theorem):
i) Fix a pair of parameters (±;r) and a pair of Nash dominating payo¤s (¹ u1; ¹ u2) >
(¼C;¼C). The strategy given by (19) gives a Nash Equilibrium with Consistent Beliefs in
Pure Strategies if and only if the following system of inequalities holds
¦¤(®;±; ¹ Qi; ¹ Qj) ¸ ¦0(®;¯;±;r; ¹ Qi; ¹ Qj); 8®;¯ 2 [0;1]: (23)
Here the payo¤ functions are given by formulae (20-22) and pair ( ¹ Qi; ¹ Qj) are those in the
claim above.
ii) For any pair of individually rational feasible playo¤s (¹ u1; ¹ u2) > (¼C;¼C) there exists
an ² = ²(¹ u1; ¹ u2) > 0 that for any ± ¸ 1¡ ² and r · ² the system of inequalities (23) holds.
Result 5 shows that for any individually rational feasible outcome there exists an equi-
librium strategy that support this outcome if the discount factor is su¢ciently high and the
range of price realizations are su¢ciently concentrated. The …rst statement of this result
can be proved exactly in the same way as Result 3. Given the …rst part of the result, the
proof of the second part is provided in Appendix (A3).
8 Conclusion
This paper demonstrated that full cooperation is possible in a repeated Cournot Duopoly
with private monitoring. The key property of the model sustaining this result is that the
support of the price signals depends on the players’ actions. We showed that for a moderate
level of noise, the monopoly outcome can be supported for the same range of the discount
factor as in the perfect monitoring case, and we established a Folk Theorem for our model.
We conclude the paper by discussing some possible directions of future research and
complications which may arise along the way.
In Section 6 it was shown that the strategy we constructed fails when the density of the
noise on the right end of the support is zero. Further analysis shows that in general the sit-
uation cannot be remedied by applying a grim trigger strategy which initiates a punishment
phase after realizations of the signal close to the right end of the support. The di¢culty is
that there are always in…nitesimally small pro…table deviations involving either increased or
27decreased production. Hence, the situation in which the noise has zero density noise on the
right end of its support needs a more elaborate investigation.
One might develop another modi…cationof the grim trigger strategy which allows sustain-
ing themonopoly outcome for noisiness of thesignal which is larger than the ones established
in this paper. One possibility is to impose a more severe punishment for deviationthan mov-
ing to the Cournot outcome.
Additionally, themodel canalso beadapted tostudy cases withmore thantwo…rms. Here
every …rm observes the estimate of the total production of the rest of the industry. Similar
to the duopoly case, the non-deviator plays the monopoly quantity while the signal is “good”
and punishes using the Cournot quantity when adeviationhas been detected.22 The deviator
plays the penitent action when the detection probability is lower than the threshold level,
and plays a one period best response when the detection probability is higher. The primary
di¢culty of moving to the n …rm case is not conceptual but computational: for example, the
threshold probability is the solution of a polynomial of order of the number of …rms minus
one.
Another direction of research is to allow for correlation between signals. It would be
interesting to see how the equilibrium set § from Section 5 changes while the correlation
between signals increases from 0 to 1. Notice that this is a gradual transformation of the
model from private monitoring to public monitoring situation.
The presence of nonlinear demand does not a¤ect the applicability of the our model.
In this case the expected price becomes dependent on the signal noisiness, which makes
the monopoly and Cournot outcome sensitive to the level of noise of signal. The other
components of the model and strategy construction stay intact.
Throughout the paper we imposed a restriction on the highest possible level of noisiness.
It was assumed that the monopoly and Cournot levels of production are observationally
di¤erent to allow for the construction of beliefs with one period memory. However, when
consider overlapping supports, including in…nite support, the same signal realizations for
cooperative and non-cooperative actions of the other …rm exist. In this case, beliefs will
be functions of the …rm’s whole set of private information. This situation, which is more
22Note that the identity of the deviator is not known to the …rm.
28complex than the one presented in this paper, requires further research.
9 Appendix
A1. Proof of Result 3
Proof that the strategy described by formula (14) gives a Nash Equilibrium with Con-
sistent Beliefs in Pure Strategies as given by de…nition 1. The proof is provided in a few
steps.
Step 1: The structure of a game history and an information set.
Suppose the players have played t periods. According to the game structure, any t period



















Fix a player i, and call her opponent j. After any time period ¿ < t, player i observes
only her action qi
¿ and the signal ~ qj
¿ about the action qj
¿ of player j. So the information set23
of player i at time t, hi











¿ ¡ r; ~ q
j




¿ + r] 2 R
4t;
where multiplication means the Cartesian product and the sequence of pairs f(qi
¿; ~ qj
¿); ¿ =
0;:::;t¡ 1g represents all of player i’s observations at period t.
De…nition 1 requires beliefs ¹(hi
t) for player i for every information set hi
t. These beliefs
should be sequentially consistent. This is the scope of the next two steps.
Step 2: , Constructionofa sequence of completely mixedbehavioralstrategiesas required
by De…nition 1.
Let f(x;!;¾2) denote the density function of the normally distributed random variable
with expectation ! and variance ¾2. Then for each information set hi
t we consider the totally
23The information set re‡ects a partitioning of all possible game histories according to player i’s private
information.




































where s(:;:) is the equilibrium strategy.














of probability around points of the following uniform grid fQk = QP +2kr;k = ¡1:::+1g
and the rest of the probability around the quantity prescribed by the equilibrium strategy.
By the constructionsupp(sn(qi
t;hi









what is required by de…nition 1.
Step 3: Calculation of the limiting beliefs of a player for each information set.
The sequence of totally mixed behavioral strategies is given by formula (24). For a given
information set hi
t , by Bayes’ rule player i’s beliefs ¹n(hi
t) can be uniquely determined.
Moreover, the limiting belief ¹(hi
t) may be found. ¹(hi
t) is in fact a density function over hi
t,
which shows how likely it is for the game to be at a certain node of hi
t. This distribution,
together with a particular form of the equilibrium strategy, gives a distribution of possible




t). Any of functions ~ ¹ and ¹ are su¢cient for checking the optimality of player i’s
behavioral strategy. Unlike ¹ the description of ~ ¹ is simple. From now on without loss of




summarizes the results for the current step.
The …rst statement of Lemma 1 shows that for any hi




describes a random action which has only two possible realizations fQP;QCg. In other
words, to characterize the density function ~ ¹(q
j
t;hi
t) we need a scalar function, say, ®(hi
t)
which speci…es the probability that player j’s plays QC.25
The second result of Lemma 1 gives a closed form solution for the function ®(¢). More
importantly, it states that the probability of player j’s playing QC at time t only depends
on player i’s private observation in period t¡ 1.
24±(x ¡ a) is called delta function and it denotes the density of a deterministic random variable which
takes the value a.
25®(q) as presented in paper is this probability.











> > > <
> > > :
0 if qi
t¡1 · QP and ~ q
j
t¡1 ¡ QP · r
qi
t¡1¡QP
2r if 0 < qi
t¡1 ¡ QP · 2r and ~ q
j
t¡1 ¡ QP · r
1 otherwise
PROOF:
i) This statement we prove by using the principle of mathematical induction on t. For
t = 0itcanbeseen that supp(~ ¹(q
j
0;hi
0)) = fQPg because the mixture of behavioral strategies
at time zero should converge to the equilibrium strategy. Therefore, it will be expected that
player j plays QP for sure.
Now suppose that the statement (i) of the lemma is true for any t · T ¡1: Consider the
information set hi
T. By the inductive hypothesis, the beliefs ¹n(hi




T¡1) which leave player j with two possible actions, QP and QC , in period T ¡1.
So the behavioral mixtures will be “concentrated” around those two actions. In the limit
as n ! 1 the Bayesian rule together with the signal q
j
T¡1 gives player i what we call the
“intermediate” belief that (at T ¡ 1) player j has played for sure either QP + 2kr (k 2 Z)
(see the formula (24)) or QC at T ¡ 1: This intermediate belief arises due to the additional
information that arrives as ~ q
j
T¡1 get realized. Now consider player j. By the equilibrium
strategy, the action of player j at T ¡ 1, which we described above, and the signal ~ qi
T¡1
determine the action of player j at period T. She should follow the equilibrium strategy
(14). So it can be checked that this action can be either QP or QC.
ii) From the proof of the statement above it follows that player i’s subjective beliefs, say,
that if the following two events have occurred: a) player j played QP + 2kr (k · 0) in the
previous period, and b) the signal player j received was less than QP + r , then player j
plays QP. When player i gets the signal ~ q
j
t¡1 · QP + r, she believes that (a) happened




2r . All of this gives the expression for the probability of …rm j’s playing the
noncooperative level of production. Q.E.D.
31Step 4: Proof of the one-stage deviation principle.
The one-stage deviation principle is heavily used in the next step. We present it in the
following
Lemma 2 (One-stage deviation principle) Consider a multistage game with incomplete in-
formation and restricted one-stage payo¤ set. Then for a behavioral strategy to be the best
response it is necessary and su¢cient to check that any one-period deviation at any infor-
mation set does not increase the continuation payo¤ of the player who makes the decision at
the information set considered.
PROOF:26
Necessity. Follows immediately.
Su¢ciency. We start the proof from the contrary statement and then we …nd a contra-
diction. Suppose that for a player starting on period t there exists a set of deviations from
the behavioral equilibrium strategy such that the player’s payo¤ is increased by " > 0. Let
~ t stands for the last period when there is an information set where a deviation takes place.
There are two cases: in the …rst ~ t is …nite, while in the second ~ t is in…nite.
Now we show that without loss of generality we can restrict attention to the …rst case.
This is done by reducing the second case to the …rst one. Suppose ~ t is in…nite. Let UH
be the highest possible one-stage payo¤ of the player. No deviation generates a one-stage
payo¤ higher than UH; which implies that if deviations take place after period t; then the
highest possible payo¤ is no larger than ±
t+1UH: Given that the equilibrium expected payo¤
is bounded from below by UL it is possible to …nd ^ t that ±
^ t+1UH¡±
^ t+1UL < "=2. As a result
we can remove all deviations after period ^ t, consider deviations until period ^ t , and get the
…rst case with ~ t = ^ t: The improvement of the payo¤ is no less than "=2 and so it is su¢cient
to examine only the …rst case.
26The proof of the lemma’s result is provided in almost exactly the same way as the one for the ”one-stage
deviation principle” in in…nitely played games with perfect information (see Fuderberg and Tirole (1991)).
This is due to two reasons. First, we are dealing with information sets, which “evolve” in the same tree
like fashion. Second, by dealing with the behavioral strategy at all information sets we avoid the issue of
reaching some information sets with probability zero.
32Consider case 1. There are deviations in information sets from time period t until ~ t.
Those deviations improve the payo¤ by ". Now starting with information sets whose time
duration is ~ t; let us replace deviations by equilibrium behavioral strategies. By the one-
stage deviation principle these replacements cannot reduce the continuation payo¤ at these
information sets. Hence these replacements yield another example of case 1, except that the
terminal period is now reduced in 1, and the payo¤ improvement is no less than ": So in a
…nite number of steps we get ~ t = t; which means that we found the one period deviations
that improved the continuation payo¤ in at least " > 0. We reached a contradiction, which
proves the su¢ciency statement of this lemma. Q.E.D.
Step 5: Derivation of necessary and su¢cient conditions.
From De…nition 1 and the result of the previous step it follows that we need to make sure
that no deviation at any information set yields a larger continuation payo¤. From step 3
we know that any information set may be “labeled” with the probability that the opponent
plays QC instead of QP. We denote this probability as ®. Any one period deviation at time
t is characterized by the quantity produced, which is denoted by q.
There are three possible situations:
i) q · QP. In this situation, due to equilibrium strategy all these levels of q provide the
same continuation play of the opponent. But q = QP, which is prescribed by equilibrium
strategy, give the uniformly highest payo¤ for any level of ®. So any deviation q < QP
cannot be a pro…table deviation.
ii) q ¸ QP + 2r. The opponent will detect the deviation with probability 1 and continue
to behave by producing QC. Again analogous to the previous situation all q’s but ^ Q(®) ¸
QP + 2r cannot be optimal and ^ Q(®) is part of the equilibrium strategy.
iii) QP < q < QP + 2r. This action can be uniquely characterized by the probability of
inducing a signal higher than QP +r. This probability is ¯ = ®(q), where the function ®(q)
is given by (8). The continuation payo¤ is ¦®¯(®;¯;±;r). Hence, if the continuum set of
inequalities (17) hold any deviation of situation (iii) in not pro…table.
A2. Proof of Result 4
We develop the proof in several steps.
33Step 1: Proof that the system holds when r = 0.
Substituting formulae (15) and (16) into (17) when r = 0 we get
maxf¦P(®;±);¦F(®;±)g ¸ (1¡ ±)¼(QP;®)+ ±[(1¡ ®)¦
¤(¯;±) + ®¼C] (25)
Now the RHS27 becomes ¦P(®;±) when ¯ = 0. The proof of this step follows from the
fact that ¦¤(¯;±) is a nonincreasing function of ¯.
Step 2: Modi…cation of the system of inequalities while r is changing.
When r is nonzero the initial system of inequalities (17) can be modi…ed in the following
form
¢¦(®;¯;±) ¸ (1¡ ±)¢¼(®;¯;r) 8®;¯ 2 [0;1]; (26)






and ¢¦(®;¯;±) = ¦0
E(®;±) ¡ ¦0
D(®;¯;±). The functions ¦0
E(®;±) and ¦0
D(®;¯;±) are
the LHS and RHS of inequality (25) correspondingly.
The properties of the new function ¢¦(®;¯;±) are studied in the next steps. As for
the function ¢¼(®;¯;r); it is continuous and increasing in r on the interval [0;1=24] with
¢¼(®;¯;0) = 0. Given that ¢¦(®;¯;±) is nonnegative (see the previous step) and the
properties of ¢¼(®;¯;r), it follows immediately that for a given ± the set of r’s for which
the set of inequalities holds has the form [0;¹ r(±)].
In order to …nd ¹ r(±) we gradually increase r until for some pairs (®;¯) the inequality (26)
binds for some r < 1=24, where 1=24 comes from restriction (6). Such pairs we call “critical”
pairs. In the next step we …nd the restriction for critical values of ®.
Step 3: For any critical pair ® = ®¤(±).
The functions ¢¦(®;¯;±) and ¢¼(®;¯;r) are continuous in their arguments. Also it
can be seen that the function ¢¼(®;¯;r) is linear in ®. In turn the function ¢¦(®;¯;±) is
piecewise linear in ® with the kink at ® = ®¤(±). Hence any critical value of ® is critical
27Throughout we will refer to the right hand side and the left hand side of any relationship as RHS and
LHS, respectively.
34together with one of three possible values f0;®¤(±);1g. The rest of this step shows that 0
and 1 cannot be critical values without ®¤(±) being a critical value as well.
Case ® = 1 : From the system of inequalities (25) and formula (27) it follows that










The highest possible level of ¢¼(1;¯;r) is when ¯ and r reach their highest possible
values in which case ¢¼(® = 1;¯ = 1;r = 1=24) = 1=144. Hence the inequality (26) holds
for all values of ¯ and r, so it is not possible to have critical pairs (®;¯) with ® = 1.
Case ® = 0 : In this case it can be seen that for ® · ®¤(±) the function ¢¦(®;¯;±)
has the form ¢¦(®;¯;±) = (1 ¡ ®)'(¯;±), where the function '(¯;±) is nonnegative. Now
suppose that at ® = 0 and for some ^ ¯ and ^ r the inequality (26) holds with equality or
'(^ ¯;±) = (1 ¡ ±)¢¼(0;^ ¯; ^ r). Then, because ¢¼(1; ^ ¯; ^ r) ¸ 0 and ¢¼(®; ^ ¯; ^ r) is linear in ®
it follows that ¢¦(®¤(±);^ ¯;±) ´ (1 ¡ ®¤(±))'(^ ¯;±) · (1 ¡ ±)¢¼(®¤(±); ^ ¯; ^ r). Hence if the
system of inequalities (26) binds at ® = 0 and some r; then it binds at ® = ®¤(±) and the
same or lower level of r. So ® = 0 cannot be a critical value without ®¤(±) being a critical
value as well.
The original system of inequalities is parameterized by two parameters ® and ¯. This
step …xes the …rst parameter ®, what helps to decrease the dimensionality of the system and
moves us to the construction of the boundary curve ¹ r(±).
Step 4: Derivation of two boundary curves r1(±) and r1(±), their values are higher than
1=48.
From the previous step we found that in order to …nd the highest possible value of r at
which the system of inequalities (26) holds, we can restrict our attention to values of ® equal
to ®¤(±). Given that the function ¢¦(®¤(±);¯;±) can be represented as





















The function ¢¦(®¤(±);¯;±) is the minimum of two well behaved functions. One way to
…nd the largest r, for which the function ¢¦(®¤(±);¯;±) still dominates ¢¼(®¤(±);¯;r), is
the following. First, we …nd the largest r for the function ®¤(±)±¢¦1(¯;±), which we refer
to as r1(±). Then we do the same for ®¤(±)¢¦2(¯;±) and call the associated value of r as
r2(±). Clearly the function of interest ¹ r(±) is the minimum of the functions r1(±) and r2(±).
Before studying eachcase separately let us prove the following lemma which is very handy
throughout this step.
Lemma 3 (1 ¡ ®¤(±))±
1
72 > (1¡ ±)
2¡®¤(±)
144 , where the function ®¤(±) is given by (13).
PROOF: Below we present a series of simultaneous transformations applied to both sides
of the inequality. They preserve the above inequality and facilitate the task of checking
whether it holds. The sequence of inequality preserving operations on both sides is: mul-





2 ¡ ± ¡ (1 ¡ ±)2
o
, take the square and …nally subtract ¡16(3±¡1)2(2±
2¡±).
These transformations brings us to the inequality (1 ¡ ±)4 > 0, which is obviously holds.
Q.E.D.
Now let us derive the two curves in a sequence.
Curve r1(±) : The function ¢¦1(¯;±) is linearly increasing in ¯ and ¢¦1(0;±) = 0. In
turn the function ¢¼(®¤(±);¯;r) is quadratic in ¯, has a nonpositive second derivative and
¢¼(®¤(±);0;r) = 0. Moreover, the function ¢¼(®¤(±);¯;r) is increasing in r. From all of
the above it follows that we can increase r until the slopes (derivatives in ¯) of the two
functions ®¤(±)±¢¦1(¯;±) and (1¡ ±)¢¼(®¤(±);¯;r) at ¯ = 0 are get equal. This gives us








36where the LHS is the derivative of (1 ¡ ±)¢¼ and the RHS is the derivative of (1 ¡
®¤(±))±¢¦1 w.r.t. ¯ at ¯ = 0.
Now by substituting r1(±) = 1=48 into the LHS we have (1 ¡ ±)
1+(1¡®¤(±))=2
144 , which is
strictly less than (1 ¡ ®¤(±))±
1




Lemma 4 r1(±) >
1
48 for all ± 2 [±;1).
















The above function is continuous on [±;1) except at the points where the denominator
is zero and the expression under the square root is negative. It can be checked that those
points are outside the region [±;1).














PROOF: The above limits result from a Taylor expansion of the numerator around the
point ± = 1. Q.E.D.
From the above lemma it follows that lim
±!1
r1(±) = 1=48 and it can be checked that r1(±) =
21=544.
The monotonicity properties are hard to investigate but from the graphical representation
of the function on Figure 9 we see that it is a monotonically decreasing function of ±.
Curve r2(±) : Inthis case both functions ¢¦2(¯;±) and ¢¼(®¤(±);¯;r) are increasing and
quadratic in ¯ with a negative curvature. At ¯ = 0 the function ¢¦2(¯;±) is nonnegative
and at ¯ = 1 it is equal to 1=72. The highest possible level of the function ¢¼(®¤(±);¯;r) is
achieved at ¯ = 1 and r = 1=24; in which case the function equals
2¡®¤(±)
144 . From lemma 3 it
37follows that the two functions (1¡ ®¤(±))±¢¦1(¯;±) and (1¡ ±)¢¼(®¤(±);¯;r) never meet
at the point ¯ = 1.
Before …nding the closed form of r2(±), let us show that all values of r2(±) are strictly
higher than 1=48.
Lemma 6 r2(±) > 1=48 for all ± 2 [±;1).













The above function is concave in ¯. Let us consider a linear function of ¯, L(¯;±) which at
¯ = 0 has the same value and derivative as the above function (1¡ ±)¢¼(®¤(±);¯; 1
48). This
function has the form






Next, the following two inequalities hold
(1¡ ®¤(±))±¢¦2(0;±) = (1¡ ®¤(±))±
17± ¡ 9
576











where the …rst inequality follows from the fact that ± ¸ 9=17; and the second inequality
follows from lemma 3.
Because the function ¢¦2 is concave in ¯, it follows that the function (1 ¡ ®¤(±))±¢¦2
strictly dominates the linear function L(¯;±) except at the point ¯ = 0 when ± = 9=17.
As a result when r = 1=48, the function (1 ¡ ®¤(±))±¢¦2 strictly dominates the function
(1¡±)¢¼; except at the point (¯;±) = (0;9=17). Comparing the derivatives w.r.t. ¯ of these
two functions at the point (¯;±) = (0;9=17), we get the strict inequality 9=544 > 1=204; so
the result of the lemma holds with strict inequality. Q.E.D.
We now return to determining the form of r2(±). The only possibility left is that the two
functions considered above are tangent in ¯ at the highest possible level of r = r2(±). The
38tangency condition gives us the necessary system of equations for ¯2 (the ¯ where two curves



































where the …rst equation states that the functions are equal and the second equation states
that their derivatives coincide.
By solving for ¯2 from the second equationwhich is linear in¯2 and by substituting it into
the …rst one we get a polynomial of fourth order in r2(±), and then we can write down four
possible solutions for r2(±). The …rst two solutions are §
p
(1¡®¤(±))±
48 which do not generate
values greater than 1=48. For the other two solutions by applying lemma 5 we get that one
of the roots has the property lim
±!1
r2(±) = 1=408 < 1=48, while the other one has the property
lim
±!1





















It can be checked that this function is continuous in ± on [±;1) and lim
±!1
r2(±) = 1=24 and
r2(±) = 9=272.
Monotonicity properties is hard to investigate but from a graphical representation of the
function (see Figure 9) we see that the function r2(±) is a monotonically decreasing function
of ±.
A3. Proof of the Folk Theorem
Proof that there exists su¢ciently small ²(¹ u1; ¹ u2) > 0 such that for any ± ¸ 1 ¡
²(¹ u1; ¹ u2) and r · ²(¹ u1; ¹ u2) the system of inequalities in (23) holds.
The system of inequalities (23) may be rewritten as
¦¤(®;±; ¹ Qi; ¹ Qj) ¸ (1¡ ±)¼( ¹ Qi + 2¯r;®; ¹ Qj) + ±
£
(1¡ ®)¦¤(¯;±; ¹ Qi; ¹ Qj) + ®¼C
¤
:
28To get the formula for the other root in which lim
±!1
r2(±) = 1=408 ths plus sign before 2
p
2 should be
replaced by the minus sign.
39Note that thelast termof the RHS is increasingin¯ andtheRHS equal to¦P(®;±; ¹ Qi; ¹ Qj)
when r = 0 and ¯ = 0. The …rst term of RHS is increasing in ¯ and the second term is
decreasing in ¯. The rate of increase of the …rst term declines till 0 with a decrease of r and
so we can always …nd su¢ciently small r which makes the above inequality true. The proof
is complete if we take the bound for ± from the Perfect Information case.
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